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1 Introduction
The importance of the role played by labor market frictions in labor market dynamics and in
macroeconomic fluctuations is increasingly recognized. The key modelling tool in this context is
the aggregate search and matching model developed by Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides [see
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999 a,b) for surveys and Pissarides (2000) for a detailed exposition].
However, recent papers have questioned the model’s empirical performance in U.S. data. This
literature poses doubts with respect to the model’s ability to account for the observed behavior of
key variables — unemployment, vacancies, worker flows, wages, and the duration of unemployment.
The aims of this paper are to answer two questions: (i) Does the model fit the data, and, if so, on
what dimensions? (ii) Does the data “fit” the model, i.e. which data are relevant in the context
of the model? The analysis produces a workable, empirically-grounded version of the model that
may be used to analyze U.S. data and study policy questions. The basic motivation is to try to
understand whether the model — beyond its theoretical appeal — is indeed useful for the analysis
of the U.S. labor market. The idea is to make precise the dimensions on which the model does well
and those on which it does not do well or even fails.
When coming to undertake such analysis a number of fundamental problems arise:
(i) How to model the driving shocks? It is known from the business cycle literature that
fluctuations often mimic the pattern of the shocks and that the model itself may lack propagation
mechanisms. A similar problem may be the case here too.
(ii) How to avoid the “contamination” of labor market analysis by mis-specification of other
parts of the macroeconomy? General equilibrium models have well-known problems that are yet to
1Prepared for the conference in honor of Dale Mortensen at Sandbjerg, Denmark, August 15-18, 2004. I am
indebted to Dale for inspiration and encouragement over the years. I am grateful to Jordi Gali , Martin Lettau,
Fabien Postel-Vinay and Etienne Wasmer for useful conversations, to Craig Burnside for advice, data and software,
to Jeﬀrey Fuhrer, Hoyt Bleakley, Ann Ferris and Elizabeth Walat for data, and to Darina Waisman for excellent
research assistance. Any errors are mine.
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be resolved. Studying the empirical performance of the search and matching model in conjunction
with other parts of the macroeconomy could thus lead to rejection of the model due to the afore-
mentioned “contamination.”
(iii) How to model the frictions so as to determine what role they play in explaining the
data? Many studies in the literature are highly stylized, use short cuts, or employ reduced-form
modelling that is useful for theoretical exposition but is problematic when attempting an empirical
examination of the model. It is then diﬃcult to see how the degree of frictions matters in accounting
for the data. For a model that puts frictions at center stage this is highly problematic. Thus, in
cases where the model is shown not to fit the data, it is not always clear whether a particular
specification of labor market frictions is responsible for the diﬃculty or whether this reflects a more
essential problem.
(iv) How to determine the equilibrium eﬀects of shocks? There is a need for a structural
model that can trace out the eﬀects of shocks on equilibrium dynamics and determine what is the
role of frictions in this process.
(v) What are the proper data to use for the key elements of the model — the pool of
searching workers and the stock of searching jobs (vacancies)? Questions regarding these data have
been raised a number of times by diﬀerent authors but have not been systematically treated in the
current context. Hence, it is unclear to which extent the model-data fit is subject to problems with
the data used rather than to problems with the model.
The paper takes the following approach to address these problems: to deal with (i) and
(ii), it uses a partial equilibrium model and a reduced-form VAR of the actual data to specify the
driving shocks. This ‘agnostic’ approach precludes the possibility that labor market dynamics will
be aﬀected by misspecifications in other parts of a more general macroeconomic model. Thus it
does not take a particular stand on the sources of the driving shock processes nor does it formulate
an explicit structure for the rest of the macroeconomy. To deal with (iii) and (iv) it uses a structural
approach: it specifies agents’ objectives and constraints, their optimal behavior, and the dynamic
paths of key variables in equilibrium. The structural parameters quantify the degree of frictions.
The fifth issue is treated by looking at alternative formulations of the pool of searching workers,
taking into account also non-employed workers outside the oﬃcial unemployment pool. The paper
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also uses newly available gross worker flows data that are compatible with the model’s formulations,
rather than vacancy data, which are shown to be inconsistent with the concepts of the model.
The model is a stochastic version of the search and matching model. It characterizes firms’
optimal search behavior, deriving a relationship that equates marginal hiring costs with the present
value of a hire — the “asset value” of the job-worker match. The firm’s decision on vacancy creation
feeds into a matching function, which generates a flow of hires given the stocks of job vacancies and
unemployment. The wage is determined by the Nash bargaining solution, which splits the surplus
from the job-worker match. The resulting model is a partial equilibrium model, with employment
(and unemployment), vacancies, and the wage defined by the equilibrium solution.
The non-linear equilibrium solution of the model is log-linearized using a first-order Taylor
approximation to obtain a system of linear diﬀerence equations. The system formalizes the dy-
namics of the key variables in terms of exogenous, stochastic variables and in terms of structural
parameters that quantify the frictions. The model is then calibrated. As mentioned, a reduced-form
VAR determines the relevant parameters for the exogenous shock processes. These include labor
productivity shocks, shocks to the match separation rate, and shocks to the discount rate. Other
calibrated values are set using historical data averages or econometric estimates. The model’s
implied second moments are compared to U.S. data in terms of persistence, co-movement, and
volatility.
I find that for the most part the model fits U.S. labor market data relatively well. This
includes capturing the high persistence and high volatility of most of the key variables, as well as
the negative co-variation of unemployment and vacancies (the ‘Beveridge curve’).
The paper makes several contributions: first, it oﬀers an empirically-grounded model of
aggregate U.S. labor market dynamics as implied by the search and matching model. Doing so it
provides macroeconomists some guidance concerning the relevant “building block” for modelling the
labor market. Second, by calibrating the model and evaluating it against alternative formulations
of the data, it is able to show on what dimensions the model fits the data and which data series are
the relevant ones. Third, particular specifications of the model are able to replicate key empirical
regularities in U.S. data which other models have been unable to capture; the reasons for this
improved performance are discussed. In terms of the calibration-simulation methodology, there is
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an innovation in the “agnostic” approach taken with respect to the formulation of shocks.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the search and matching model. At the
end of this section I point out the contributions of Dale Mortensen in the current, macroeconomic
context. Section 3 derives the equilibrium dynamics and steady state, highlighting the role of
frictions. Section 4 discusses the data series, presents the properties of the data that are to be
matched, and proposes alternative formulations of the data to be used. It also reports the results
from recent literature that found problems in the fit of the model. Section 5 calibrates the model and
evaluates the model-data fit. Section 6 examines the mechanism underlying the results, deriving
the modelling and data lessons for using the model to study the U.S. labor market. Section 7
concludes.
2 The Search and Matching Model
In this section I briefly present a stochastic, discrete-time version of the prototypical search and
matching model.2 An important addition to the standard analysis is a convex formulation for
the hiring costs function, which has the standard linear formulation as a special case. This in
turn necessitates taking into account the eﬀect of employment on wages in the firm’s optimality
condition and in the wage solution.
2.1 The Basic Set-Up
There are two types of agents: unemployed workers (U) searching for jobs and firms recruiting
workers through vacancy creation (V ). Firms maximize their intertemporal profit functions with
the choice variable being the number of vacancies to open. Each firm produces a flow of output (F ),
paying workers wages (W ) and incurring hiring costs (Γ). Workers and firms are faced with diﬀerent
frictions such as diﬀerent locations leading to regional mismatch or lags and asymmetries in the
transmission of information. These frictions are embedded in the concept of a matching function
which produces hires (M) out of vacancies and unemployment, leaving certain jobs unfilled and
certain workers unemployed. Workers are assumed to be separated from jobs at a stochastic,
2A detailed exposition may be found in Pissarides (2000). The stochastic, discrete time formulation presented
here follows Yashiv (2004).
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exogenous rate, to be denoted by δ. The labor force (L) is growing with new workers flowing into
the unemployment pool. The set-up, whereby search is costly and matching is time-consuming,
essentially describes the market as one with trade frictions. Supply and demand are not equilibrated
instantaneously, so at each date t there are stocks of unemployed workers and vacant jobs.
The model assumes a market populated by many identical workers and firms. Hence I shall
continue the discussion in terms of “representative agents.” Each agent is small enough so that the
behavior of other agents is taken as given. As is well known this creates various externalities. In
particular, more search activity creates a positive trading externality for the trading partner and a
congestion externality for similar agents [see the discussion in Pissarides (2000, chapter 7)].
2.2 Matching
A matching function captures the frictions in the matching process; it satisfies the following prop-
erties
Mt,t+1 = fM(Ut, Vt) (1)
∂fM
∂U
> 0,
∂fM
∂V
> 0
Empirical work [see the survey by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)] has shown that a
Cobb-Douglas function is useful for parameterizing it:
Mt,t+1 = µUσt V
1−σ
t (2)
where µ stands for matching technology. From this function the hazard rates — P, the worker
probability of finding a job and Q, the firm’s probability of filling the vacancy — are derived:
Pt,t+1 =
Mt,t+1
Ut
= µ(
Vt
Ut
)1−σ (3)
Qt,t+1 =
Mt,t+1
Vt
= µ
µ
Vt
Ut
¶−σ
(4)
The parameter σ reflects the relative contribution of unemployment to the matching process and
determines the elasticity of the hazard rates with respect to market tightness.
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2.3 Firms
Firms maximize the expected, present value of profits (where all other factors of production have
been “maximized out”):
max
{V }
E0
∞X
t=0
(
tY
j=0
βj) [Ft −WtNt − Γt] (5)
where βj =
1
1+rt−1,t
.
This maximization is done subject to the employment dynamics equation given by:
Nt+1 = (1− δt,t+1)Nt +Qt,t+1Vt (6)
The Lagrangean of this problem is (where Λ is the discounted Lagrange multiplier):
L = E0
∞X
t=0
(
tY
j=0
βj) [Ft −WtNt − Γt + Λt {(1− δt,t+1)Nt +Qt,t+1Vt −Nt+1}] (7)
The F.O.C are:
∂Γt
∂Vt
= Qt,t+1EtΛt (8)
Λt = Etβt+1
∙
∂Ft+1
∂Nt+1
− ∂Γt+1
∂Nt+1
−Wt+1 −Nt+1
∂Wt+1
∂Nt+1
¸
+Et(1− δt+1,t+2)βt+1Λt+1 (9)
Nt+1 = (1− δt,t+1)Nt +Qt,t+1Vt (10)
and the transversality condition:
lim
T→∞
Et
⎡
⎣(
T−1Y
j=0
βj)
⎧
⎨
⎩
∂FT
∂NT
−WT −
∂ΓT−1
∂NT−1
βT−1
−NT−1
∂WT−1
∂NT−1
⎫
⎬
⎭NT
⎤
⎦ = 0 (11)
The first, intratemporal condition (equation 8) sets the marginal cost of hiring ∂Γt∂Vt equal
to the expected value of the multiplier times the probability of filling the vacancy. The second,
intertemporal condition (equation 9) sets the multiplier equal to the sum of the expected, discounted
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marginal profit in the next period Etβt+1
h
∂Ft+1
∂Nt+1
−Wt+1 − ∂Γt+1∂Nt+1 −Nt+1
∂Wt+1
∂Nt+1
i
and the expected,
discounted (using also δ) value of the multiplier in the next period Et(1− δt+1,t+2)βt+1Λt+1. Note
that because I postulate that Γ depends on N (see below), the net marginal product for the firm
depends on N. This marginal product is part of the match surplus bargained over, and therefore
part of the wage solution discussed below. Hence the term ∂Wt+1∂Nt+1 , usually absent, is not zero in
this formulation.
For production I assume a standard Cobb-Douglas function:
Ft = AtKtαN
1−α
t (12)
where A is technology and K is capital.
Hiring costs refer to the costs incurred in all stages of recruiting: the cost of advertising and
screening — pertaining to all vacancies (V ), and the cost of training and disrupting production —
pertaining to actual hires (QV ). For the functional form I use a general power function formulation
which encompasses the widely-used linear and quadratic functions as special cases. This functional
form emerged as the preferred one − for example as performing better than polynomials of various
degrees − in structural estimation of this model reported in Yashiv (2000a,b) and in Merz and
Yashiv (2004). The former study used an Israeli data-set that is uniquely suited for such estimation
with a directly measured vacancy series that fits well the model’s definitions. The latter study used
U.S. data. Formally this function is given by:
Γt =
Θ
1 + γ
(
φVt + (1− φ)QtVt
Nt
)γ+1Ft (13)
Hiring costs are function of the weighted average of the number of vacancies and the number of
hires. They are internal to production and hence are proportional to output. The function is
linearly homogenous in V,N and F. It encompasses the cases of a fixed cost per vacancy (i.e.
linear costs,γ = 0) and increasing costs (γ > 0). When γ = 1 I get the quadratic formulation
(Θ2 (
φVt+(1−φ)QtVt
Nt
)2Ft) which is analogous to the standard formulation in “Tobin’s q” models of
investment where costs are quadratic in IK . Note that Θ is a scale parameter, φ is the weight given
to vacancies as distinct from actual hires, and γ expresses the degree of convexity.3
3Note that its derivatives, used below, are given by:
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2.4 Wages
In this model, the matching of a worker and a vacancy against the backdrop of search costs, creates
a joint surplus relative to the alternatives of continued search. Following Diamond (1982) and
Mortensen (1982), the prototypical search and matching model derives the wage (W ) as the Nash
solution of the bargaining problem of dividing this surplus between the firm and the worker [see
the discussion in Pissarides (2000, Chapters 1 and 3)].
Formally this wage is:
Wt = argmax(JNt − JUt )ξ(JFt − JVt )1−ξ (14)
where JN and JU are the present value for the worker of employment and unemployment respec-
tively; JF and JV are the firm’s present value of profits from a filled job and from a vacancy
respectively; and 0 < ξ < 1 reflects the degree of asymmetry in bargaining.
Using the Stole and Zweibel (1996) approach as implemented by Cahuc, Marque and Was-
mer (2004) to solve (14) taking into account the fact that ∂Wt+1∂Nt+1 6= 0, the wage is given by:4
Wt = ξ
⎛
⎝ (1− α)A
³
Kt
Nt
´α h
1
1−αξ +Θ(
φVt+(1−φ)QtVt
Nt
)γ+1 α+γ(1+γ)(1−α)(1−ξ(1+α+γ))
i
+Pt,t+1Λt
⎞
⎠ (15)
+(1− ξ)bt
where b is the income of the unemployed, such as unemployment benefits.
I assume that bt is proportional to Wt i.e. bt = τWt, so τ may be labelled the “replacement
ratio.” Hence:
∂Γt
∂Vt
= Θ (φ+ (1− φ)Qt) (
φVt + (1− φ)QtVt
Nt
)γ
Ft
Nt
∂Γt
∂Nt
= Θ(
φVt + (1− φ)QtVt
Nt
)γ+1
Ft
Nt
?
1− α
1 + γ
− 1
?
4The solution entails postulating the asset values of a filled job and of a vacant job for the firm and
the asset values of employment and unemployment for the worker in (14). See the technical appendix at
http://www.tau.ac.il/~yashiv/performance.html for details of the derivation.
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Wt =
ξ
1− (1− ξ)τ
⎛
⎝ (1− α)A
³
Kt
Nt
´α h
1
1−αξ +Θ(
φVt+(1−φ)QtVt
Nt
)γ+1 α+γ(1+γ)(1−α)(1−ξ(1+α+γ))
i
+Pt,t+1Λt
⎞
⎠
Denoting ξ1−(1−ξ)τ by η and formulating the wage in terms of the labor share in income (by dividing
this wage by the average product) I get:
Wt = st
Ft
Nt
st = η
⎛
⎝ (1− α)
h
1
1−αξ +Θ(
φVt+(1−φ)QtVt
Nt
)γ+1 α+γ(1+γ)(1−α)(1−ξ(1+α+γ))
i
+Pt,t+1λt
⎞
⎠ (16)
This wage solution has the following properties:
a. Wages are proportional to productivity FtNt but the proportionality coeﬃcient st is time-
varying.
b. Wages and the wage share increase with worker bargaining power (ξ) or replacement
ratio (τ) as expressed by η.
c. Wages and the wage share are a positive function of the future value given by Pt,t+1λt.
Thus wages are positively related to the asset value of the match.
2.5 Equilibrium
The stocks of unemployment and employment and the flow of hiring emerge as equilibrium solutions.
Solving the firms’ maximization problem yields a dynamic path for vacancies; these and the stock
of unemployment serve as inputs to the matching function; matches together with separation rates
and labor force growth change the stocks of employment and unemployment. Formally:
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Vt = argmaxE0
∞X
t=0
(
tY
j=0
βj) [Ft −WtNt − Γt + Λt {(1− δt,t+1)Nt +Qt,t+1Vt −Nt+1}]
Ut = Lt −Nt
Mt,t+1 = fM(Ut, Vt)
Nt+1 = (1− δt,t+1)Nt +Mt,t+1
Wt = argmax(JNt − JUt )ξ(JFt − JVt )1−ξ (17)
This dynamic system may be solved for the five endogenous variables V,U,M,N and W
given initial values U0, N0 and given the path of the exogenous variables. The latter include
β, δ and L, variables included in the firms’ profit function and variables included in the workers
unemployment value function JU .
As noted above, this is a partial equilibrium model. The exogenous variables include the
worker’s marginal product, the discount factor and the separation rate. If the production function
is CRS and if the capital market is perfect — as I shall assume — the capital-labor ratio will be
determined in equilibrium at the point where the marginal product of capital equals the interest
rate plus the rate of depreciation. This in turn will determine production and the marginal product
of labor. This set-up is consistent with several diﬀerent macroeconomic models. For example Merz
(1995) and Andolfatto (1996) have shown that a special case of this model may be combined with
traditional elements of RBC models to yield a dynamic general equilibrium model. In these models
the interest rate equals the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution in consumption.
In the following section I solve explicitly for a stochastic, dynamic equilibrium using a
stochastic structure for the exogenous variables.
2.6 The Contributions of Dale Mortensen
Dale Mortensen has made fundamental contributions to the model presented above. The first one,
in the celebrated 1970 “Phelps volume” [Mortensen (1970)], introduced the flow approach to the
labor market and incorporated search costs. In that paper the firm’s intertemporal choice was
shown to be akin to investment with adjustment costs. The papers which followed introduced all
the key ingredients of the model: bilateral matching and surplus division in Mortensen (1978),
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aggregate matching and surplus division using the Nash solution in Mortensen (1982a); the last
paper also discussed the incentives of agents to engage in search. Eﬃciency aspects of the matching
and bargaining situations were analyzed in Mortensen (1982b). Finally the model was expanded
to incorporate idiosyncratic productivity and endogenous separations in Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994).
3 Steady State and the Stochastic Dynamic Equilibrium
I use a log-linear approach, transforming the non-linear problem into a first-order, linear, diﬀerence
equations system through approximation and then solving the system using standard methods.
More specifically I undertake the following steps:
(i) I postulate a stochastic set-up for the exogenous variables. As noted in the introduction,
I use a reduced-form VAR procedure to characterize the shocks rather than imposing a structural
formulation.
(ii) Using the F.O.C, I characterize the non-stochastic steady state.
(iii) The deterministic version of the F.O.C of the firm’s problem, including the flow equation
for employment, is linearly approximated in the neighborhood of this steady state, using a first-
order Taylor approximation.
(iv) This yields a first-order, linear, diﬀerence equations system, which solution gives the
dynamic path of the control and the endogenous state variables as functions of sequences of the
exogenous variables.
(v) Working from a certainty equivalence perspective, the deterministic sequences for the
exogenous variables are then replaced with the conditional expectations at time t for the afore-cited
stochastic processes.
3.1 Dynamic Solution
Basically I am interested in exploring the dynamics of the labor market relative to its growth trend.
Growth comes from two sources: productivity growth and population growth. To abstract from
population growth, in what follows I cast all labor market variables in terms of rates out of the labor
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force Lt, denoting them by lower case letters. Productivity growth is captured by the evolution of
A, which enters the model through the dynamics of FtNt so I divide all variables by the latter. This
leaves a system that is stationary and is aﬀected by shocks to labor force growth, to productivity
growth, as well as to the interest rate and to the job separation rate, to be formalized below.
I now further develop the F.O.C. in order to get a stationary representation with fewer
variables. I begin with (8). Transforming the equation into a stationary one through the afore-
mentioned divisions the equation becomes:
Θ (φ+ (1− φ)Qt) (
φVt + (1− φ)QtVt
Nt
)γ = Qt,t+1Etλt (18)
where I define:
λt ≡
Λt
Ft
Nt
(19)
Inserting into (9) and dividing throughout by Ft+1Nt+1 :
λt
GXt+1
= Etβt+1
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
(1− η)
⎛
⎝(1− α)
⎡
⎣
1
1−αξ
+Θ(φVt+1+(1−φ)Qt+1Vt+1Nt+1 )
γ+1 α+γ
(1+γ)(1−α)(1−ξ(1+α+γ))
⎤
⎦
⎞
⎠
−ηPt+1,t+2λt+1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
+Et(1− δt+1,t+2)βt+1λt+1 (20)
where the (gross) rate of productivity growth is given by:
GXt+1 ≡
Ft+1
Nt+1
Ft
Nt
(21)
Dividing (6) by Lt throughout I get:
nt+1G
L
t+1 = (1− δt,t+1)nt +Qt,t+1vt (22)
where I define 1+the growth rate of the labor force as:
GLt+1 ≡
Lt+1
Lt
(23)
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3.2 The Stochastic Set-Up
The model has four exogenous variables. These are productivity growth (GX −1, see equation 21),
labor force growth (GL − 1, see equation 23), the discount factor (β) and the separation rate (δ).
Empirical testing reveals that GL can be modelled as white noise around a constant value. When
I tried to add it as a stochastic variable to the framework below the results were not aﬀected. I
thus treat it as a constant. It is the other three variables that inject shocks into this system. These
variables are basically the variables that make up the firm’s future marginal profits, with higher
GX increasing these profits and higher β or δ decreasing them. As mentioned, I do not formulate
the underlying shocks structurally. Instead, I postulate that they follow a first-order VAR (in terms
of log deviations from their non-stochastic steady state values):
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bGXt+1bβt+1bδt+1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ = Π
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bGXtbβtbδt
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦+Σ (24)
In the empirical section below I use reduced-form VAR estimates of the data to quantify the
coeﬃcient matrix Π and the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbances Σ. Thus the current
model is consistent with both RBC-style models that emphasize technology shocks as well as with
models that emphasize other shocks.
3.3 The Non-Stochastic Steady State
In the non-stochastic steady state the rate of vacancy creation is given by:
Θ (φ+ (1− φ)Q) (φV + (1− φ)QV
N
)γ = Q
GXβ
[1− (1− δ)GXβ]π (25)
The LHS are marginal costs; the RHS is the match asset value. It is probability of filling
a vacancy (Q) times the marginal profits accrued in the steady state. The latter are the product
of per-period marginal profits π and a discount factor G
Xβ
1−GXβ(1−δ) that takes into account the real
rate of interest, the rate of separation and productivity growth.
Labor market flows are given by:
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(δ +GL − 1) = m
n
=
Qv
n
(26)
This expression equates the rate of increase in employment through matching with the
sum of the rates of separation and increase in the labor force. From this equation the rate of
unemployment in equilibrium is given by:
u =
δ + (GL − 1)
δ + (GL − 1) + P (27)
3.4 Log-Linear Approximation
I log-linearly approximate the deterministic version of the F.O.C in the neighborhood of the steady
state. For each variable Y, I use the notation bYt = Yt−YY ≈ lnYt − lnY where Y is the steady state
value, so all variables are log deviations from steady state.
Approximating the intratemporal condition (18), the intertemporal condition (20), and the
dynamic equation for employment (22) and combining all of them I get (the technical appendix
available at http://www.tau.ac.il/~yashiv/performance.html spells out the complete derivation):
⎡
⎣ bnt+1bλt+1
⎤
⎦ =W
⎡
⎣ bntbλt
⎤
⎦+R
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bGXt+1bβt+1bδt+1,t+2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦+Q
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
bGXtbβtbδt,t+1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ (28)
where W,R,Q are matrices which are functions of the parameters and steady state values.
This system is a first-order, linear, diﬀerence equation system in the state variable bn and the
co-state bλ with three exogenous variables, bGX , bβ and bδ. The matrices of coeﬃcients are defined by
the parameters α,Θ, γ, φ, µ, σ and η and by the steady state values of various variables. The solution
of this system enables us to solve for the control variable − vacancies, and for other variables of
interest, such as unemployment, hires, the matching rate, and the labor share of income.
4 U.S. Labor Market Data
In coming to relate the model to U.S. data, a number of important issues arise. The following
discussion shows that the diﬀerent variables have multiple representations in the data and some
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are not consistent with the concepts of the model. The idea is to select those series that do match
these concepts and to examine alternative representations wherever relevant.
I proceed as follows: in 4.1 I discuss the relevant pool of searching workers, who are defined
as u, unemployed, in the model; in 4.2 I conduct a similar discussion for job vacancies v; in 4.3
I consider the flow of hires m and in 4.4 the relevant wage data s; in 4.5 I briefly discuss other
data series; finally, in 4.6 I present summary statistics, including second moments, and discuss the
properties of the data in terms of persistence, volatility, and co-movement. I end the section with
a discussion of the findings of recent literature that questions the model’s ability to fit these data.
4.1 The Relevant Pool of Unemployment
In order to see how the model relates to the data, a key issue that needs to be resolved is the size of
the relevant pool of searching workers. The question is whether this pool is just the oﬃcial unem-
ployment pool or a bigger one. The model speaks of two states — employment and unemployment;
in the model matches are flows from unemployment to employment and separations are flows from
employment to unemployment.5 In the actual data — taken from the CPS — several important issues
arise:
(i) Flows between the pool out of the labor force and the labor force, including flows directly
to and from employment, are sizeable. Blanchard and Diamond (1990) report that in worker flows
data — adjusted according to the methodology of Abowd and Zellner (1985) and covering the period
1968-1986 — unemployment to employment flows are only slightly bigger — at 1.6 million workers
per month — than out of the labor force to employment flows, at 1.4 million per month. More recent
data, computed using the methodology of Bleakley et al (1999) for the period 1976-2003, indicate
that unemployment to employment flows are on average 1.9 million workers per month, while out
of the labor force to employment flows are 1.5 million workers per month on average.
(ii) Clark and Summers (1979) have argued that there is substantial misclassification of
unemployment status and that “many of those not in the labor force are in situation eﬀectively
equivalent to the unemployed” (p.29), providing several measures to substantiate this claim. One
implication that emerges from their study is that including such misclassified workers in the unem-
5Additionally, labor force growth (with new participants joining the unemployment pool) is an exogenous variable.
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ployment pool generates a longer average duration for unemployment and hence a smaller matching
hazard (P in the model) relative to the oﬃcial unemployment pool. Data collectors were aware
of this issue: following the recommendations of the Gordon committee, which recognized that
there could be some form of “hidden unemployment,” beginning in January 1967 the CPS included
questions on out of the labor force people who could potentially be defined as unemployed. This
generated a quarterly series on people that responded aﬃrmatively to the question if they “wanted
a job now” (I report this series below). Castillo (1998) [who oﬀers a detailed discussion and addi-
tional references concerning the CPS procedure] reports, using 1994 data, that about 30% of this
pool actually searched for work in the 12 months prior to the survey, and 47% were in the prime
age category (25-54).
(iii) Working on the re-designed CPS data in the period 1994-1998, Jones and Riddel (2000)
further demonstrate the importance of these distinctions. Key results include estimates of the
hazard rates for three worker groups: the unemployed, the marginally attached, and the unattached,
the last two being oﬃcially classified as out of the labor force. Their monthly hazard rates are 0.20-
0.35 for the unemployed, 0.10-0.20 for the marginally attached, and below 0.05 for the unattached.
Various tests indicate that these are indeed three distinct states.
(iv) The out of the labor force flows exhibit markedly diﬀerent cyclical properties relative
to flows between employment and unemployment: the unemployment to employment flows are
countercyclical or a-cyclical while the out of the labor force to employment flows are pro-cyclical.6
Given this evidence, it appears natural to consider pools of workers outside the labor force
when coming to study labor market dynamics and worker flows. The question is how to add the
unobserved ‘unemployment’ pool from out of the labor force to the ‘oﬃcial’ pool of unemployment.
6There are two major data sets on worker flows: Blanchard and Diamond (1990, see in particular Figures 1,10
and 11) and Bleakley et al (1999).
The unemployment to employment flows are negatively correlated with the rate of employment ( −0.91 for the
1968-1986 Blanchard and Diamond data and −0.50 for the 1976-2003 Bleakley et al data) and negatively correlated
or uncorrelated with GDP per capita (−0.61 for the 1968-1986 data and 0.12 for the 1976-2003 data).
The out of the labor force to employment flows are positively correlated with the rate of employment (0.56 for the
1968-1986 Blanchard and Diamond data and 0.70 for the 1976-2003 Bleakley et al data) and with GDP per capita
(0.56 for the 1968-1986 data and 0.76 for the 1976-2003 data).
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Blanchard and Diamond (1989, 1990) suggest that the relevant additional pool is made up of the
people described in point (ii) above. Another method to estimate this pool is to compute the
number of people within the out of the labor force group that would generate matching rates (MU )
identical to those that are observed for unemployment to employment flows.7 Figure 1 shows the
resulting two new series, as well as the oﬃcial unemployment rate, for the period in which the series
exist.
7This estimate — based on the relationship P = MU — is computed as follows: first note that
PUE =
MUE
U
where MUE is the unemployment to employment flow and U is the oﬃcial pool. Then, assuming PUE holds true,
and using data on out of the labor force to employment MNE flow, we compute:
U∗ =
MUE +MNE
PUE
= U(
MUE +MNE
MUE
) = U(1 +
MNE
MUE
)
The oﬃcial rate is given by UN+U while the new rate is given by
U∗
N+U∗ . The relation between the two series in rates
is thus:
U∗
N+U∗
U
N+U
=
U∗
U
N + U
N + U∗
= (1 +
MNE
MUE
)
1 + UN
1 + U
∗
N
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Figure 1: Alternative unemployment series (rates)
The oﬃcial rate in this period has a mean of 6.3%. The series that adds workers who said
they want a job has a mean of 10.4% and the second series has a mean of 10.9% of the relevant
labor force. As can be seen in the figure, the series are highly correlated: the new series have a
0.97 correlation between them and high correlations with the oﬃcial rate (0.98).
These series, however, are likely to be lower bounds on the relevant unemployment pool:
the first series was constructed in reference to indicating a desire for a job now ; this precludes other
out of the labor force groups who wish to work at a future date, for example people in training or in
school. In terms of our two-state model these people could be subsequently flowing directly to the
employment pool and thus have to be classified as unemployed. As to the second series, the data
support the proposition that the matching rate (P = MU ) used to generate it is an upper bound on
the relevant rate, as persons out of the labor force are likely to experience higher unemployment
durations. Hence the resulting unemployment pool is a lower bound on the relevant pool. For
example, analysis of 1994 data in Castillo (1998) shows that while matching rates for the oﬃcially
unemployed were 0.53, they were only 0.31 for the “wanted a job” pool. The issue, then, is how
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many non-employed workers does one add from out of the labor force to the already expanded
pools shown in Figure 1.
The strategy I use in the empirical work is as follows. I look at the three “natural” candidate
series: (i) oﬃcial unemployment, (ii) oﬃcial unemployment and the “want a job” category (depicted
above) and (iii) the entire working age population. As the relevant pool may lie between the second
and third cases and as no measured pool is available, I look at two additional specifications that
try to approximate that pool. Thus, starting from case (ii) I gradually add parts of the remaining
workers from the out of the labor force pool. Table 1 provides sample statistics of these five series.
Table 1
Two features stand out: while the mean of the series evidently rises with the expansion of
the pool, the volatility hardly changes going from the oﬃcial +want a job pool to the larger pools;
the series are highly correlated (though the correlation slightly declines as the pool expands).
In what follows, I look at the properties of the data under these diﬀerent specifications.
In Section 5 below, I compare the performance of the calibrated model against these alternative
specifications and decide on a benchmark specification for the subsequent analysis.8
4.2 Job Vacancies
The relevant concept of vacancies in the model is the one relating to those vacancies that are to be
filled with workers from outside the employment pool (I shall denote it by V UN ). But the available
and widely-used data series pertains to another concept, which also includes vacancies that are
subsequently filled with workers moving from job to job (to be denoted by V NNt ).
9 Simply this can
be expressed as follows:
8Previous papers have taken on a variety of approaches to this issue, which are special cases of the current
examination: Blanchard and Diamond (1989) have essentially considered the relevant pool to be the first series
reported in Figure 1, Merz (1995) took the oﬃcial pool of unemployment, and Andolfatto (1996) considered the
entire working age population as unemployed in the model.
9This should not be taken to mean that firms post two types of vacancies. The idea is just to say that some
vacancies are ex-post filled by previously unemployed workers and the rest by previously employed workers moving
directly from job to job.
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V tott = V
UN
t + V
NN
t
The V tott series in the U.S. economy has two representations: one is the index of Help
Wanted advertising in newspapers published by the Conference Board; this series was analyzed and
discussed in Abraham (1987). A newer series is the job openings series available from the BLS since
December 2000 using the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS).10 The two series have
a correlation of 0.88 over 37 monthly observations. The following figure plots these two vacancies
series as well as a third series: the gross flows of workers from outside employment (unemployment
and out of the labor force) to employment, which can be taken to represent Q× V UN . The latter
was recently compiled at the Boston Fed based on CPS data [see the Data appendix below and
Bleakley et al (1999)]. The figure shows all three series normalized:
10A job is “open” only if it meets all three of the following conditions: (i) a specific position exists and there is
work available for that position; the position can be full-time or part-time, and it can be permanent, short-term, or
seasonal; (ii) the job could start within 30 days, whether or not the establishment finds a suitable candidate during
that time; and (iii) there is active recruiting for workers from outside the establishment location that has the opening.
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Figure 2: Hiring vs. the two vacancy measures (normalized)
The hiring flows series is negatively correlated with the two vacancy series: −0.27 with the
JOLTS series and −0.36 with the Help Wanted ads series. The flows series also appears to be much
less persistent than the vacancies series.
Table 2 presents the coeﬃcient of variation (or standard deviation) and autocorrelation
for the two vacancy series and for the hiring series. It does so first for their respective individual
samples and then for the common sample period. It reports the variables in levels, in logged HP-
filtered form, and subsequently in terms of their ratios to unemployment, which can be taken as a
measure of market tightness.
Table 2
Compared to the volatility of the Help Wanted Index, hiring volatility is about a seventh
in levels, a fifth in HP filtered terms, and about a third in ratios to unemployment terms. It is
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similarly less volatile than the JOLTS data series. In terms of persistence, hiring is substantially
less persistent in levels and even more so in HP-filtered terms; it has similar persistence in market
tightness terms.
This comparison — between V tot and Q× V UN — suggests that V tot may either be very dif-
ferent from V UN or that the behavior of Q generates these discrepancies. Without direct measures
of V UN it is not possible to determine which explanation holds true but there is indirect evidence.
Using the data on Q × V UN shown above one can run a regression of the matching function as
follows:
ln
µ
Qt,t+1V UNt
Nt
¶
= ln bµ+ bσ lnµUt
Nt
¶
+ (1− bσ) lnµ Vt
Nt
¶
Previous estimates of the matching function — as surveyed by Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001) and as exemplified by the Blanchard and Diamond (1989) analysis — indicate that bσ is
around 0.4 to 0.5. This means that the regression should yield around 0.4 to 0.5 for the coeﬃcient
of ln
³
Ut
Nt
´
and around 0.6 to 0.5 for the coeﬃcient of ln
³
Vt
Nt
´
. Using the Help Wanted index for
V one gets an estimate of around 0.3 for the coeﬃcient of ln
³
Ut
Nt
´
but only 0.1 for the coeﬃcient
of ln
³
Vt
Nt
´
, irrespective of the estimation technique (OLS, TSLS or GMM) or the instruments
used. The extremely low value for the latter coeﬃcient implies that hiring rates (from outside
employment, i.e. Qt,t+1V
UN
t
Nt
) do not relate well to the vacancy rate when the latter is measured by
the Help Wanted Index. This is consistent with the interpretation that the behavior of the Help
Wanted Index, which relates to the broader V tot , is diﬀerent from the behavior of the relevant
series here, V UN .
Another exercise is to compute a “reconciling Q” to be denoted Qsimt,t+1 i.e.
Qsimt,t+1 =
MUNt,t+1
V tott
which makes the series (V tot , V UN ) compatible and then see whether it reasonably fits with the
model. The model predicts the following relationship:
Qt,t+1 = µ
µ
Vt
Ut
¶−σ
Note that the “reconciling,” simulated Q can be written as:
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Qsimt,t+1 =
MUNt,t+1
V tott
= QUNt,t+1
V UNt
V tott
Note that as V
UN
t
V tott
→ 1, then Qsimt,t+1 → QUNt,t+1. Running a regression based on the model’s
formulation i.e.:
lnQ = ln k − a ln
µ
Vt
Ut
¶
using Qsim for Q and the Help Wanted Index for V, I get an estimate of a of about 0.7, higher
than the 0.4 to 0.5 range cited above for σ. In other words the simulated Q is more responsive to
variations in market tightness than usual estimates of σ indicate. This is likely to occur the more
diﬀerent are V UNt and V
tot
t .
11
Another body of evidence is to be found in recent work on gross worker flows. Fallick and
Fleischman (2004), using CPS data in the period 1994-2003, find that employment to employment
flows are large; in fact 2/5 of new jobs represent employer changes. They also show that the
cyclical properties of employment to employment flows are very diﬀerent from those of the flows
into and out of employment. Nagypal (2004), using micro data sets, provides additional, supporting
evidence on the prevalence of job to job worker flows. Hence V NN = V tot − V UN appears to be of
substantial magnitude. Pissarides (1994) oﬀers one possible explanation for the higher volatility of
11The regression postulates
Qsimt,t+1 = k
?
V tott
U
?−a
The model posits:
Qsimt,t+1 = µ
?
V UN
U
?−σ
V UNt
V tott
Hence:
k
?
V tott
U
?−a
= µ
?
V UN
U
?−σ
V UNt
V tott
Taking logs and re-arranging we get:
a = σ − lnµ− ln k
ln
?
V tott
U
? −
(1− σ) ln
?
V UNt
V tott
?
ln
?
V tott
U
?
Only when V
UN
t
V tott
= 1 and when µ = k will the estimate a equal σ.
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vacancies that relate to both job to job movements (V NN in the above notation) and to movements
from out of employment (V UN): these “broader” vacancies (i.e. V tot) are more responsive to
productivity changes and hence are more volatile. The reason for the increased responsiveness
is that employed workers, as well as unemployed workers, change their search activities following
productivity changes, thereby aﬀecting the incentives of firms in opening job vacancies.
The conclusion from this discussion is the following: the present model, being an aggregate,
representative firm-type of model, does not deal with job to job movements (as is also the case for
the recent literature cited below), and thus the Help Wanted Index is not the relevant series to use
as it probably does not behave like the relevant series (V UN ). Given that the latter is unobserved,
I resort to focusing on the observed worker flow series (i.e. on Q× V UN) whenever comparing the
model to the data (though the model will generate predictions also with respect to V ). The above
discussion also implies that care must be taken when using or discussing vacancy data in the U.S.
economy.
4.3 The Flow of Hires and the Worker Hazard Rate
The discussion on the relevant pool of unemployment makes it clear that it is important to analyze
the flow of matches or hires using out of the labor force to employment flows as well as unemploy-
ment to employment. This implies that in addition to diﬀerent unemployment pools U , there will
be diﬀerent matching flows M and consequently diﬀerent worker hazard rates P = MU . Figure 3
presents these diﬀerent rates.
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Figure 3: Alternative specifications of the hazard rate P
The 0 and 1 series represent the ones derived from the oﬃcial rate and from the oﬃcial+want
a job series respectively, both depicted in Figure 1 above. They imply unemployment durations
of 17.4 weeks and 16. 5 weeks respectively. In comparison, oﬃcial BLS data on duration indicate
15.1 weeks on average (with 2.5 weeks standard deviation) in the same period. The other series —
specifications 2,3 and 4 — evidently imply higher durations: 28.0, 39.0 and 91. 8 weeks respectively.
All rates are highly correlated with the notable exception of specification 4, which is almost uncor-
related with the 0 and 1 specifications (correlations of 0.10 and -0.03 respectively) and weakly to
moderately correlated with the 2 and 3 specifications (0.23 and 0.53 respectively).
The following table compares these estimates, based on aggregate worker flow and non-
employment stock data, to the estimates of the afore-cited Jones and Riddell (2000) micro-based,
CPS 1994-1998 study:
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Table 3
The oﬃcial pool has a slightly higher hazard than the upper bound of the Jones and Riddel
estimate (i.e. 0.80 compared to 0.73). From the three intermediate pools, specification 2 has a
hazard rate (0.47) that is consistent with a mixture of the unemployed and the marginally attached.
The largest pool, that includes all non-employed workers (specification 4 here), has a hazard rate
(0.14) that seems to be consistent with a mixture of the unattached with the other two groups.
4.4 Wages
The existence of diverse data series for wages with diﬀerent cyclical properties was noted by several
papers [see in particular Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995), Abraham, Spletzer and Stewart (1999),
and Krueger (1999)]. The discussion in these papers does not lead to any definite conclusion as to
which series is the most appropriate. Figure 4 illustrates one aspect of this issue by plotting BEA
series of the labor share s = WF/N , once using total compensation
12 and once using wages.
12Defined as total compensation of employees relative to GDP; this includes, beyond wages and salaries, supplements
such as employer contribution for employee pension and insurance funds and employer contribution for goverment
social insurance.
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Figure 4: the labor share s
The series are correlated 0.83 but have a number of important diﬀerences: the wage series
declines more over time, is lower by ten percentage points on average, and displays much more
variation (coeﬃcient of variation of 0.037 relative to 0.016 for the other series). It should also be
noted that both series have very weak correlation with the cycle: the compensation series has -0.05
correlation with the employment rate and the wage series has a 0.12 correlation.
In what follows I use the compensation series as it takes all firm’s wage-related costs, which
is the relevant concept in the model.
4.5 Other Data Series
Figure 5 shows the other data series to be used in the empirical work below: productivity growth
GX (gross rate), the discount factor β, and the separation rate δ (separately for the oﬃcial unem-
ployment specification δ0 and for the others δ).
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Figure 5: GX , β, δ0, δ
For productivity growth I take the rate of change of GDP per worker; for the discount
factor I take β = 11+r where r is the cost of firm finance (weighted average of equity finance and
debt finance); for the separation rate I take the flow from employment divided by the stock of
employment.
4.6 Data Properties
Table 4 reports the first two moments of all relevant data series, including measures of persistence
and co-movement. When looking at these moments it is important recall that the business cycle is
most clearly manifested in the labor market — there is high correlation between employment and
output and their volatility is similar. The table describes the key moments across the diﬀerent
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specifications of the unemployment pool (and the labor force). Column 0 is the benchmark speci-
fication — it uses the oﬃcial unemployment pool. Column 1 is the ‘lower bound’ specification with
unemployment including the oﬃcial pool and those workers out of the labor force indicating that
they “want a job.” Columns 2 and 3 add to column 1 a fraction — 15% and 30% respectively — of
the remaining persons out of the labor force. Column 4 considers the entire working age population
as the labor force.
Table 4
The following major properties can be said to characterize the data:
Persistence. All the main labor market variables are persistent: the rate of unemployment
(and thus employment), hiring, separation, and the wage share all exhibit high persistence. There
is some variation across the diﬀerent cases: unemployment persistence increases slightly as the
unemployment pool is expanded and the reverse is true for hiring and separation. At the same
time productivity growth and the discount factor are not persistent at all. Note that one of the
three driving shocks — the separation rate — is persistent.
Volatility.
(i) The table indicates diﬀerential volatility across variables and across specifications of the
pool of searching workers. With only the oﬃcially unemployed considered searching (column 0),
the volatility of the unemployment rate is the highest at 0.22 in terms of log levels; less volatile are
the hiring and separation rates, which have comparable volatility at about 0.13-0.16; the discount
factor has a volatility of 0.06 in the same terms; the volatility of the rate of employment (n = NL )
is of the same order of magnitude as that of the wage share at around 0.015 (in the same log
terms); productivity growth at 0.007 has even lower volatility. Note that this is somewhat akin
to investment behavior: the capital stock (here the employment stock) is much less volatile than
investment (here the hiring flow). Note too the relatively high volatility of the rate of separation
and of the discount factor, which are driving factors.
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(ii) When moving across columns to a broader specification of the pool of searching workers
some patterns change: in relative terms, hiring and separation become more volatile (at 0.07-0.10
in column 4) than unemployment (at 0.07). In absolute terms the employment rate becomes more
volatile while unemployment, hiring and separation (in rates) all become less volatile.
Co-movement.
(i) Hiring rates (m) co-vary positively with the unemployment rate, while the worker hazard
rate usually co-varies negatively with the same variable. This means that hiring flows (in rates) are
counter-cyclical (see the discussion of the various unemployment pools above)13 but job-finding
rates P = mu are pro-cyclical. Note that in recessions U rises and P falls; hence
M
L =
P ·U
N+U rises as
the eﬀect of a rising U overcomes the fall in P and any change in L.
(ii) Separation rates (δ) are counter-cyclical. Note that hiring and separation rates move
together, unlike the widely-known negative correlation between job creation and job destruction in
the manufacturing sector. This issue is discussed in Nagypal (2004).
(iii) The labor share in income (s) varies between a-cyclicality and counter-cyclicality (with
respect to employment) according to the specification of the labor force. Throughout it covaries
positively with the hiring rate. This means that when FN rises in booms, the wage (W ) rises by less
and thereby the labor share (s) declines.
(iv) There is low correlation between employment and productivity growth, a fact which
has received considerable attention in the RBC literature Note that the data here are in terms of
the log of the employment rate and the first diﬀerences of the log of productivity but that they
display essentially the same co-movement pattern that is discussed in the business cycle literature
in terms of HP-filtered and logged productivity and employment.
(v) Employment has low co-variation with the discount factor.
Note some non-intuitive aspects of these data moments: in booms hiring and separation
rates fall and the labor share either does not change or falls. Hiring is strong at the same time as
the share of wages is high.
Recently, some authors have questioned the ability of the model to explain these data. Cole
and Rogerson (1999) found that the model can account for business cycle facts only if the average
13This is also true for logged and HP-filtered variables.
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duration of unemployment is relatively high (9 months or longer) and substantially longer than
average duration in BLS data on the unemployed. The intuition for this critique is the following:
the data point to a negative correlation between job destruction and job creation. Job destruction
leads to higher unemployment thereby raising the incentives for job creation. In order for job
creation to be contemporaneously negatively correlated with job destruction there has to be a
mitigating factor and that role is played by the relatively low worker hazard rate, which is the
inverse of unemployment duration.
Shimer (2004) showed that in the standard matching model productivity shocks of empiri-
cally plausible magnitude cannot generate the observed, large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment
and vacancies. The key reason for this result is that the standard model assumes that wages are
determined by Nash bargaining, which in turn implies that wages are “too flexible.” Thus, for exam-
ple, following a positive productivity shock wages increase, absorbing the shock, thereby dampening
the incentives of firms to create new jobs. In particular, while the model predicts roughly the same
volatility of the vacancy to unemployment ratio and of productivity, the data indicate this ratio is
actually 18 times more volatile.
Veracierto (2002) has shown that the model fails to simultaneously account for the observed
behavior of employment, unemployment and out of the labor force worker pools. Analyzing the
RBC model with search and matching that makes an explicit distinction between these states, he
finds that the model has serious diﬃculties in reproducing the labor market dynamics observed in
U.S. data. In particular, employment fluctuates as much as the labor force while in the data it is
three times more variable, unemployment fluctuates as much as output while in the data it is six
times more variable, and unemployment is acyclical while in the data it is strongly countercyclical.
An underlying reason is that search decisions respond too little to aggregate productivity shocks.
Fujita (2004) conducted empirical tests showing that vacancies are much more persistent in
the data than the low persistence implied by the model.
Taken together these studies cast doubt on the model’s ability to fit the data on two key
dimensions: the volatility and duration of unemployment, and the volatility and persistence of
vacancies. They also point to serious shortcomings in accounting for aggregate wage behavior.
I turn now to the calibration of the model under the diﬀerent data specifications and the
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evaluation of its performance against the data.
5 Calibration and Model-Data Fit
In this section I calibrate the model and examine its performance, taking into account the alternative
formulations of the pool of searching workers discussed above. I begin by discussing calibration
values in sub-section 5.1. I then (5.2) examine the performance of the model.
5.1 Calibration
Calibration of the model requires the assignment of values to the parameters of the production,
hiring costs, and matching functions as well as to the wage bargain, to the steady state values
of the exogenous variables (labor force growth, productivity growth, the discount factor and the
separation rate) and to the steady state values of the endogenous variables. To do so I use, wherever
possible, results from econometric studies and average values of the longest sample period available.
I then solve for all other values using the steady state relations (equations 25 and 26).
There are three structural parameters that are at the focal point of the model and that
reflect the operation of frictions. These are the matching function parameter σ (elasticity of
unemployment), the wage parameter η, and the hiring function convexity parameter γ.
For σ I use Blanchard and Diamond’s (1989) estimate of 0.4. Structural estimation of
the model using U.S. corporate sector data in Merz and Yashiv (2004) indicates a value of γ, the
convexity parameter of the hiring cost function, around 2, i.e. a cubic function (γ + 1 = 3) for
hiring costs. These costs fall on vacancies and on actual hires, with φ being the weight on the
former. I follow the estimates in Yashiv (2000a) and set it at 0.3.
The wage parameter η depends on the asymmetry of the bargaining solution (ξ) and on
the replacement ratio (τ). This is obviously a diﬃcult case for calibration as ξ is not directly
observed and τ depends not only on the value of benefits relative to wages but also on actual
take-up rates. Following Anderson and Meyer (1997) I postulate a value of 0.25 for the latter; to
test for robustness I tried a far higher value, finding that this change has a very small eﬀect on the
resulting moments. For ξ rather than imposing it, I solve it out of the steady state relations.
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For the production function parameter α I use a fairly traditional value of 0.68, which is
also the structural estimate of this parameter in Merz and Yashiv (2004).
For the values of the exogenous variables I use sample average values as follows: in quarterly
terms the sample average of the rate of productivity growth (GX − 1) is 0.35%; the sample average
rate of labor force growth (GL − 1) varies according to the definition of the unemployment pool
between 0.43% and 0.36%; the stochastic discount factor β − defined as the weighted price of
capital (equity and debt financed) − has a sample average of 0.993, which is close to the value used
in many business cycle studies; the sample average for the separation rate δ is 8.5%14.
For the steady state values of the endogenous variables, given the discussion above on the
relevant unemployment pool, I modify n and u according to the specifications used above. Calibra-
tion of Q, the matching rate for vacancies, is problematic as there are no wide or accurate measures
of vacancy durations for the U.S. economy. Using a 1982 survey, Burdett and Cunningham (1998)
estimated hazard functions for vacancies both parametrically and semi-parametrically finding that
the general form of the hazard function within the quarter is non-mononotic; based on their esti-
mates the quarterly hazard rate should be in the range of 0.8− 1. I thus take Q = 0.9 which is also
the value used by Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996). This implies a certain steady state value for
the vacancy rate (v). I use the average of the labor share in income s which is 0.58.
With the above values, I solve the steady state relations (25-26) for the steady state vacancy
rate v, the hiring cost scale parameter Θ, the matching function scale parameter µ, and the wage
parameter ξ. I can then solve for the steady state values of market tightness vu , the worker hazard
rate P, per period profits π and the match asset value λ.
The following table summarizes the calibrated values for the diﬀerent specifications of the
unemployment pool.
Table 5
Note two features of the implied results:
14For the case of the oﬃcial unemployment pool I use δ = 4% reflecting the rate of separation from employment
to this pool only.
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(i) The implied wage parameter η, encompassing the worker bargaining strength and the
replacement ratio, varies between 0.4 and 0.6 across specifications.
(ii) Across specifications 1-4, per period profits (π) are around 0.07-0.13 (in average output
terms) and the asset value of the match (λ) is around 0.7-1.5. Given that s = 0.58 this means
that asset values are about 1.2− 2.6 the labor share in income. In other words the match is worth
around 1 to 2.5 quarters of wages in present value terms. This quantification of asset values is
based on the values of panel (a). The latter include three values which are have not been much
investigated in the literature: the vacancy match rate Q and the parameters φ and γ of the hiring
cost function. When varying the latter values within reasonable ranges, there was no significant
change in the results. Hence the steady state calibration gives a sense of the magnitude of hiring
costs or match asset values.
As to the stochastic shocks, in order to get numerical values for the coeﬃcient matrix Π and
for the variance-co-variance matrix of Σ I estimate a first-order VAR in labor productivity growth,
the discount factor and the rate of match separation. I estimate this VAR with the relevant data
discussed above (see the Appendix for definitions and sources).
5.2 Model-Data Fit
I now turn to examine the performance of the model.15 Table 6 shows the moments implied by the
model and those of the data (repeating the moments reported in Table 4).
Table 6
The following conclusions can be drawn:
Persistence. The model captures the fact that across all specifications u,m and s are highly
persistent. The model tends to somewhat overstate this persistence.
Volatility. Column 1 captures very well the volatility of employment and unemployment.
Hiring volatility is understated by the model; best performing is column 0 which captures three
quarters of this volatility. As to the labor share, the model overstates its volatility with column
15 I use a modified version of a program by Craig Burnside in Gauss to solve the model [see Burnside (1997)].
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(4) being the closest to the data. No single specification produces a high model-data fit for all
variables.
Co-Movement. Under most specifications of the model, the counter-cyclical behavior of
hiring and the pro-cyclical behavior of the worker hazard rate are well captured. The behavior of the
labor share is not captured: while in the data it is a-cyclical to counter-cyclical (across specifications
of the unemployment pool) and co-varies moderately with the hiring rate, it is strongly pro-cyclical
in the model and has a strong negative relationship with hiring, expect for column 4 where it is
positive but overstated.
Overall fit. The model captures the persistence, volatility and some of the co-movement
in the data. The major problem concerns the labor share in income which is not well captured.
Column 1 of the model fits the data in terms of employment and unemployment behavior and has
reasonable but limited success in fitting hiring flows (fits persistence and cyclicality, understates
volatility). Column (4) seems to be providing the better fit for the labor share, doing relatively
well on volatility, reasonably well on persistence, moderately well on co-movement with hiring and
doing badly in terms of cyclical behavior.
The model also generates predictions with respect to the behavior of v and q which are
unobserved in U.S. data as explained in sub-section 4.2 above. Strictly speaking the moments
involving these variables cannot be compared to the data. But some predictions look reasonable
based on the theory and on experience in other economies: the negative correlation of u and v (the
‘Beveridge curve’) and persistent vacancy rates.
No single specification matches the data on all dimensions. Focusing on the behavior of
unemployment, employment and hiring, it looks as though specification 1 (the oﬃcial unemployment
pool and the ‘want a job’ category) is the most fitting, though specification 0 (oﬃcial unemployment
pool) cannot be ruled out.
I turn now to look at the mechanisms driving this model-data fit.
6 The Underlying Mechanism
The discussion up till now has shown which data specification is best explained by the model. The
natural question now is what underlies the fit. In order to understand the essential mechanism
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in operation, it is best to consider the following steady-state equation which elaborates on the
formulation in (25) and combines it with (26):
Θ
µ
eQγ+1 ( v1−u)γ¡
v
u
¢−σ = ∙ GXβ1−GXβ(1− δ)
¸
| {z }
Φ
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(1− η)
⎛
⎝(1− α)
⎡
⎣
1
1−αξ
+Θ(φV+(1−φ)QVN )
γ+1 α+γ
(1+γ)(1−α)(1−ξ(1+α+γ))
⎤
⎦
⎞
⎠
1 + ηP
h
GXβ
1−GXβ(1−δ)
i
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
| {z }
π
(29)
where eQ = φ+ (1− φ)Q
Equation (29) shows the vacancy creation decision as an optimality condition equating
the marginal costs of hiring with the asset value of the match. The LHS are marginal vacancy
creation costs. They take into account Q, the probability of filling the vacancy. It is clear that
the responsiveness of vacancies (v) depends on the two elasticity parameters γ (of the hiring cost
function) and σ (of the matching function). The higher is each of these, the less responsive is
vacancy creation. Many studies have assumed this is a linear function (γ = 0), thereby imposing a
particular shape on the marginal cost function.
The RHS is the asset value of the match. This value can vary because per period profits
π vary or because the discount factor Φ varies. The former may vary because of changes in the
surplus itself or changes in the sharing of the surplus, with a key parameter being η. Any policy
change in the replacement ratio τ , for example, will change η and consequently the sharing of the
match surplus. Changes in the discount factor Φ can happen because of changes in productivity
growth (GX), changes in the discount factor (β), or changes in match dissolution rate (δ).
Hence the essential mechanism is this: changes in the long run (non-stochastic steady
state) and in the stochastic dynamics are generated by changes in the surplus, in surplus sharing,
in productivity growth, in the discount rate and in the match dissolution rate, that change the
match asset values (profitability in present value terms).
The following ingredients are therefore essential:
(i) The shape of the hiring costs function determining the LHS of equation (29) i.e. the
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marginal cost function. In this context γ and σ are key parameters.
(ii) The formulation of the match surplus — this depends both on the data used and on all
key parameters of the model.
(iii) the surplus sharing rule, where η is the key parameter.
(iv) the discounting of the match surplus — here the data used (for GX , β and δ) and their
stochastic properties are key.
What is important and what is less important out of these elements of the model? One key
element is the convexity of hiring costs, hence there is an important role for γ. This parameter is
important because it is the main determinant of the elasticity of vacancies with respect to the preset
value of the match. Values of γ thus determine the persistence and volatility of vacancy creation.
The latter then influences the second moments of matching, and consequently the moments of
unemployment and employment. Another key element is the role played by the match dissolution
or separation rate δ. As it is a variable with a relatively high mean it is the main determinant of
the relevant discount factor; as it has relatively high volatility and persistence it makes the present
value of the match volatile and persistent. This in turn engenders the volatility and persistence of
vacancies, hiring and unemployment. Thus the performance of the model hinges to a large extent
on the formulation of γ and on the stochastic properties of δ. This point is elaborated and reinforced
in Yashiv (2005). The lack of fit in part of the literature is due to the use of a linear hiring cost
function (γ = 0) instead of a convex one (γ = 2 here) and due to the incomplete incorporation of
the separation rate δ.
Other elements of the model have a smaller role. The wage parameter η basically has a
scale eﬀect on per period profits and hence on the scale of asset values. It therefore aﬀects the
value of the variables at the steady state but does not aﬀect the dynamics, as it does not aﬀect
the response of vacancy creation to asset values. The matching function parameter σ, that does
have this ‘elasticity’ type of aﬀects, has a range of possible variation that is much smaller than the
variation in values of γ. For example, a reasonable change in σ would be 0.1 or 0.2 relative to the
benchmark value (which is 0.4), but a move from linear (γ = 0) to cubic (γ = 2) costs is a change
of 2 in the value of γ. The interest rate and the rate of productivity growth in their turn play a
much smaller role than the separation rate in discounting future values. While δ has a sample mean
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of 8.6% and a standard deviation of 0.8%, the rate of productivity growth (GX − 1) has a sample
mean of 0.4% and standard deviation of 0.6% and the rate of interest ( 1β − 1) has a sample mean
of 1.4% and standard deviation of 5.5%.
The afore-going discussion implies the following modelling lessons for the aggregate U.S.
labor market:
(i) In terms of the model formulation, two ingredients are important: convexity of the
hiring costs function and allowing separation costs to aﬀect the dynamics, in addition to, and
contemporaneously with, any other shock, such as productivity shocks.
(ii) In terms of U.S. data, from amongst the alternative pools of searching workers, the one
consisting of oﬃcial unemployment and the ‘want a job’ category seems to be the most consistent
with the model.
7 Conclusions
The paper has formulated a model of the U.S. aggregate labor market using log-linear approxi-
mation of the search and matching model. It has looked at alternative formulations of the data
that would be consistent with the concepts of the model. Using a VAR of the actual data it in-
jected driving shocks into the model. Comparing the resulting moments implied by the model to
the moments in U.S. data, it has shown that it can account for much of observed labor market
fluctuations. In particular, the model fits the data on persistence and volatility of most variables,
on the negative relationship between vacancies and unemployment, and on the pro-cyclicality of
the workers’ hazard (job-finding) rate. For the same formulation of the data, it fails to capture the
a-cyclicality of the labor share and its moderate positive co-variation with hiring, and it understates
the latter’s volatility; it is, however, able to come closer to capturing these features given a diﬀerent
configuration of the data.
The analysis has produced an empirically-grounded version of the search and matching
model — complete with parameter values and data series — that can be used to study the U.S. labor
market, including policy questions.
The paper raises a number of issues for further research. A key one is the need to further
explain the mechanisms in operation. In particular, one may ask what is the role of search and
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matching frictions in the dynamics; for example, how would diﬀerent degrees of frictions lead to
diﬀerent outcomes. This issue is the subject of current research (see Yashiv (2005)). Other issues
are: do the results carry over to other economies and, if so, what are the cross-country diﬀerences
in parameter values and in the dynamics? For example it would be of interest to see whether such
diﬀerences can explain the diﬀerent U.S.— European unemployment experiences.
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Data: Sources and Definitions
Data Sample. All data are quarterly U.S.data for the period 1970:I - 2003:IV, except for
hires and separations which begin in 1976:I and end in 2003:III.
Fundamental variables.
variable symbol Source
Unemployment — oﬃcial pool U0 CPS, BLS series id: LNS13000000
Workers out of l.f. who “want a job” WAJ CPS, BLS series id: LNU05026639
Unemployment — additional pool (see below) eU CPS, BLS
Employment (total), household survey N CPS, BLS series id: LNS12000000
Vacancies — Index of Help Wanted ads V Conference Board1
Hires QV CPS-based data, Boston Fed computations2
Separations δN CPS-based data, Boston Fed computations2
Working age population4 POP CPS, BLS series id: LNU00000000
Labor share5 s = WNF Table 1.12. NIPA, BEA
3
Productivity FN BLS
Cost of finance (equity and debt6) r Tables 1.1.5; 1.1.6 NIPA, BEA
Notes:
BLS series are taken from http://www.bls.gov/cps/home.htm
1. Data were downloaded from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/serie
2. See Bleakley et al (1999) for construction methodology. I thank Jeﬀrey Fuhrer and
Elizabeth Walat for their work on this series.
3. http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/home/gdp.htm
4. Total civilian noninstitutional population 16 years and older.
5. Total compensation of employees divided by GDP.
6. This is a weighted average of the returns to debt, rbt , and equity, r
e
t constructed as
follows:
rt = ωtr
b
t + (1− ωt) ret ,
with
rbt = (1− τ t) rCPt − θt
ret =
fcf test + ebst − θt
where:
(i) ωt is the share of debt finance as reported in Fama and French (1999).
(ii) The definition of rbt reflects the fact that nominal interest payments on debt are tax
deductible. rCPt is Moody’s seasoned Aaa commercial paper rate. The commercial paper rate for
the first month of each quarter represents the entire quarter. The tax rate is τ as discussed above.
i
(iii) θ denotes inflation and is measured by the GDP-deflator of NFCB GDP.
(iv) For equity return I use the CRSP Value Weighted NYSE, Nasdaq and Amex nominal
returns deflated by the inflation rate θ.
The additional pool of unemployment eU has 5 permutations as follows:
permutation number eU
0 0
1 want a job
2 want a job +0.15(POP −N − U0)
3 want a job +0.3(POP −N − U0)
4 POP −N
Transformations of variables.
variable symbol
Unemployment — total pool U = U0 + eU
Labor force L = N + U
Employment rate n = N
N+U0+?U
Unemployment rate u = 1− n
Hiring rate m = QVN
Gross rate of labor force growth GL = Ut+1+Nt+1Ut+Nt
Discount factor β = 11+r
ii
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Table 1
Stochastic Properties of Alternative Measures
of the Pool of Searching Workers
Quarterly Data
pool of workers mean std. correlations
0 1 2 3 4
0=oﬃcial pool Uo 0.06 0.014 1
1=oﬃcial+want a job 0.10 0.020 0.976 1
2=oﬃcial+want a job+0.15(POP −N − U0) 0.16 0.021 0.959 0.992 1
3=oﬃcial+want a job+0.3(POP −N − U0) 0.21 0.021 0.937 0.977 0.996 1
4=POP −N 0.39 0.022 0.856 0.908 0.953 0.977 1
Notes:
1. POP is working age population; N is civilian employment.
2. See data appendix for sources.
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Table 2
Stochastic Properties of Vacancies and Hires
Quarterly Data
individual samples common sample
levels sample coverage std.mean auto-correlation
std.
mean auto-correlation
V help wanted index 1951:I—2003:IV 0.34 0.98 0.27 0.56
V JOLTS job openings 2001:I—2003:IV 0.24 0.61 0.24 0.61
QV hires 1976:II—2003:IV 0.05 0.61 0.03 0.17
logs, HP-filtered std. auto-correlation
V help wanted index 1951:I—2003:IV 0.14 0.89
V JOLTS job openings 2001:I—2003:IV 0.28 0.60
QV hires 1976:II—2003:IV 0.03 0.05
ratio to unemployment std.mean auto-correlation std. auto-correlation
V
U help wanted index 1951:I—2003:IV 0.44 0.95 0.47 0.62
V
U JOLTS job openings 2001:I—2003:IV 0.35 0.66 0.35 0.66
QV
U hires 1976:II—2003:IV 0.16 0.94 0.15 0.64
Note:
See data appendix for sources.
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Table 3
Worker Hazard Rates P
Quarterly 1994-1998
specification average specification Jones and Riddell (2000) range
0 0.80 unemployed 0.49-0.73
1 0.82
2 0.47 marginally attached 0.27-0.49
3 0.39
4 0.14 unattached around 0.10, always below 0.14
Notes:
1. The five specifications — columns (0) to (4) correspond to the definitions in the notes to
Table 1.
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Table 4
Data Properties
a. Sample Means
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
unemployment rate u 0.06 0.10 0.16 0.22 0.39
hiring rate rate m = qv 0.046 0.079 0.074 0.070 0.054
labor force growth GL − 1 0.0043 0.0042 0.0041 0.0040 0.0036
separation rate δ 0.040 0.086
productivity growth GX − 1 0.0036
discount factor β 0.993
labor share s 0.58
b. Persistence (auto-correlation)
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ(but, but−1) 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.985 0.989
ρ(bmt, bmt−1) 0.91 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.81
ρ(bst, bst−1) 0.88
ρ( bGXt , bGXt−1) -0.014
ρ(bδt,bδt−1) 0.92 0.89
ρ(bβt, bβt−1) 0.02
c. Volatility (standard deviation)
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)bn 0.015 0.022 0.024 0.028 0.042bu 0.22 0.19 0.12 0.10 0.07bm 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07bm
u 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.04bs 0.016bGX 0.007bδ 0.16 0.10bβ 0.06
ix
d. Co-movement (correlation)
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ(but, bmt) 0.92 0.81 0.86 0.88 0.87
ρ(but, bPt) -0.91 -0.93 -0.80 -0.59 0.24
ρ(bnt, bst) -0.06 -0.16 -0.30 -0.39 -0.52
ρ(bmt, bst) 0.27 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.41
ρ(bnt, bGXt ) -0.10 -0.03 0.001 0.02 0.06
ρ(bnt, bβt) 0.15 0.10 0.04 0.00 -0.08
ρ(bnt,bδt) -0.93 -0.88 -0.91 -0.92 -0.91
Notes:
1. All data are quarterly for the period 1970:I - 2003:IV, except for hires and separations
which begin in 1976:I and end in 2003:III.
2. The diﬀerent columns diﬀer with respect to the specification of the unemployment pool. I
defiine U = U0+ eU and L = N+U where U0 is the oﬃcial pool and eU are the following additions:
Column 1 adds workers out of the labor force indicating that they “want a job.” Columns 2
and 3 add to the latter column 15% and 30% of the remaining persons out of the labor force.
Column 4 considers the entire working age population as the labor force. Column 0 is the oﬃcial
unemployment pool.
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Table 5
Baseline Calibration Values
a. Parameters, Exogenous Variables and Steady State Values
Parameter/Variable symbol (0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Production 1− α 0.68
Matching σ 0.4
Hiring γ 2
Hiring II φ 0.3
productivity growth GX − 1 0.003536
labor force growth GL − 1 0.004296 0.004199 0.004078 0.003974 0.003631
discount factor β 0.9929
separation rate δ 0.0404 0.0854
Unemployment u 0.063 0.104 0.164 0.217 0.395
Labor share s 0.579
Vacancy matching rate Q 0.9
b. Implied Values
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Matching µ 0.80 0.85 0.69 0.60 0.42
Hiring Θ 465 82 109 127 171
Wage bargaining parameter ξ 0.37 0.41 0.45 0.49 0.56
Wage parameter η 0.44 0.48 0.53 0.56 0.63
Vacancy rate v 0.047 0.089 0.083 0.078 0.060
Market tightness vu 0.74 0.86 0.51 0.36 0.15
Workers’ hazard P 0.67 0.77 0.46 0.32 0.14
Profits π 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.13
Asset Value λ 1.02 0.73 0.96 1.12 1.49
Notes:
1. The implied values of v, µ, Θ and η are solved for using the steady state relationships as follows:
Matching hazard:
Q = µ
³v
u
´−σ
Beveridge curve:
(δ +GL − 1) = µ
³v
u
´−σ µ v
1− u
¶
xi
Vacancy creation:
Θ (φ+ (1− φ)Q) (φV + (1− φ)QV
N
)γ = Q
GXβ
[1− (1− δ)GXβ]π (30)
Wage solution
s = η
Ã
(1− α)
h
1
1−αξ +Θ(
φV+(1−φ)QV
N )
γ+1 α+γ
(1+γ)(1−α)(1−ξ(1+α+γ))
i
+Pλ
!
The other variables are solved for using:
P =
Qv
u
π =
(1− η)
Ã
(1− α)
"
1
1−αξ
+Θ(φV+(1−φ)QVN )
γ+1 α+γ
(1+γ)(1−α)(1−ξ(1+α+γ))
#!
1 + ηP G
Xβ
[1−(1−δ)GXβ]
λ =
GXβ
[1− (1− δ)GXβ]π
2. The five specifications — columns (0) to (4) correspond to the definitions in the notes to Table 4.
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Table 6
Model Evaluation: Alternative Specifications
a. Model vs. Data
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ(but, but−1) Data 0.962 0.971 0.980 0.985 0.989
Model 0.989 0.983 0.990 0.993 0.996
ρ(bmt, bmt−1) Data 0.907 0.853 0.844 0.836 0.805
Model 0.991 0.986 0.991 0.993 0.992
ρ(bst, bst−1) Data 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.884
Model 0.982 0.976 0.988 0.992 0.996
std(bnt) Data 0.015 0.022 0.024 0.028 0.042
Model 0.020 0.021 0.032 0.042 0.072
std(but) Data 0.218 0.188 0.124 0.100 0.069
Model 0.298 0.182 0.165 0.151 0.110
std(bmt) Data 0.125 0.085 0.083 0.080 0.073
Model 0.097 0.051 0.035 0.022 0.018
std(bst) Data 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016
Model 0.089 0.056 0.052 0.049 0.038
ρ(but, bmt) Data 0.920 0.810 0.860 0.880 0.870
Model 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.999 -0.982
ρ(but, bPt) Data -0.909 -0.933 -0.802 -0.591 0.242
Model -0.999 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000
ρ(bnt, bst) Data -0.060 -0.160 -0.300 -0.390 -0.520
Model 0.995 0.997 0.999 1.000 1.000
ρ(bmt, bst) Data 0.272 0.451 0.445 0.440 0.414
Model -0.985 -0.989 -0.996 -0.999 0.984
b. Model predictions
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ(bvt, bvt−1) 0.952 0.961 0.986 0.992 0.996
ρ(bqt, bqt−1) 0.988 0.981 0.989 0.992 0.996
std(bvt) 0.040 0.037 0.052 0.064 0.103
std(bqt) 0.135 0.088 0.087 0.086 0.085
ρ(but, bvt) -0.956 -0.985 -0.998 -1.000 -0.999
ρ(bvt, bqt) -0.966 -0.990 -0.999 -1.000 -1.000
ρ(bvt, bst) 0.981 0.995 0.999 1.000 0.999
Notes:
The diﬀerent specifications correspond to the definitions in Table 4.
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